When Do Nondemocracies Legalize Online Information Control?

Abstract: Why do some authoritarian regimes adopt Internet laws to control online information while others do not? I argue that nondemocratic governments use Internet laws to communicate commitment to governing the online space. The adoption of new legislation requires investing time, resources, and legislative effort. In addition to allowing authorities to punish online behaviour with greater specificity and to create legal threats, the legislation adoption process communicates regime priorities. Using cross-national panel data and survival analysis, I find that nondemocratic regimes adopt Internet regulation legislation when they have high regulatory capacity and face increasing threats from offline mobilisation. The findings also show that the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the adoption of one type of such legislation, online disinformation laws. By identifying the conditions under which autocracies legalise online control, this research provides valuable insights for studies of democratic backsliding, particularly regarding how populists weaponise legal instruments to constrain opposition.