When Do Nondemocracies Legalize Online Information Control?

Abstract: Why do some authoritarian regimes implement restrictive Internet laws to control online information while others do not? Building on the literature on online repression and authori- tarian politics, I argue that nondemocratic governments use restrictive Internet regulations as a form of preventive repression in the digital space. The primary goal is to produce a chilling effect that deters opposition coordination and encourages self-censorship among the population, leading them to withdraw support for state challengers. Using cross-national panel data and a survival analysis, I demonstrate that nondemocratic regimes treat legal and extralegal tools of digital repression as complementary and incorporate restrictive Internet laws into their control strategies, particularly when they have high regulatory capacity and face increasing threats from offline mobilisation. Moreover, the findings identify a pattern of “opportunistic oppression”, where regimes exploited the COVID-19 pandemic as a window of opportunity to accelerate the legalisation of online control. Even after accounting for this exogenous shock, the pre-existing online regulatory capacity and street protests remain strong incentives for the adoption of restrictive Internet laws. This research highlights the conditions under which autocracies use a legal façade to undertake nonviolent repression in the digital era. My work also has significant implications for research on democratic backsliding that focuses on how populists weaponise legal instruments to shape mass attitudes–a topic of timely relevance given that attacks on media freedom are often the very first step in eroding democracy.